The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)’s Alliance for Securing Democracy last summer published a great policy paper about “Countering the Weaponization of Election Administration Mistakes.” The problems addressed are laid out in the Introduction:
When people perform tasks in a complex work environment, mistakes are bound to happen. Election systems are no exception. Although the 2020 presidential and 2022 midterm elections in the United States were free, fair, and well-administered, broadly speaking, some election officials made mistakes conducting them. However, in some jurisdictions, these mistakes were subsequently exploited to support unfounded claims of fraud, try to overturn fair elections, and further erode trust in US democracy. In an election environment defined by hyperpolarization and election denialism, it is therefore more important than ever for election officials to understand how to respond to election administration mistakes in order to prevent and counter their weaponization.
Case studies and recommendations to reduce election mistakes and mitigate their impacts
The Introduction closes with this summary of what the report covers:
This report examines administrative errors made in recent elections in Antrim County, Michigan, Harris County, Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona, and surveys how these errors were subsequently alleged to be conclusive proof of malfeasance. For each election, the report describes:
- The actual administrative error and how it occurred
- Actions each jurisdiction took to address the error, including their communication with the public
- The fallout from these errors, including how bad faith actors weaponized them to try to cast doubt on the integrity of the election
Drawing on these examples, the paper offers recommendations that election officials, state legislators, and other key stakeholders can adopt to both reduce the likelihood of future election administration mistakes and mitigate the impact of mistakes if they do occur. Together, these recommendations seek to prevent the weaponization of election administration errors to further undermine US elections.
The full report (PDF) is well worth a read and consideration. (Unfortunately, unlike in text of the Introduction provided as an HTML webpage, the PDF of the full report does not include functioning links—although their placement is indicated by underlined blue text.)
The report’s recommendations
The report’s recommendations “to help jurisdictions reduce the likelihood of making mistakes in the future” include election dry runs, tabletop exercises for threat scenarios, standardized recruitment and training for all poll workers, institutional succession planning, prioritizing accuracy over speed in vote counting, and increasing nonpartisan election observation.
In its recommendation on recruiting and training poll workers, a topic very near and dear to my heart, the report lays out that poll workers are crucial to the smooth and fair administration of elections in the United States, as evidenced by their significant role in the 2022 midterm elections, where around one million workers were involved. However, the country faces a critical shortage of poll workers, threatening the integrity of future elections. This issue is worsened by inconsistencies in recruitment, training, and funding across different states and localities. Notably, some states, like Texas, do not require any formal training for poll workers, leaving certain jurisdictions vulnerable to mistakes due to unqualified staff.
To address these challenges, the report recommends that all poll workers should undergo a minimum of four hours of in-person training every two years, with additional training for those in supervisory positions. (Rather than “supervisory positions,” perhaps “roles with additional technical or administrative responsibilities” would have been better here.) Supplementary online resources could further enhance their preparedness. Although no training can cover every potential Election Day issue, several hours of focused instruction would significantly improve poll workers’ ability to handle most situations and help reduce voter wait times to under 30 minutes—a “general rule” for maximum acceptable wait time.
(Interestingly, not among the recommendations having to do with recruitment of poll workers is making election day a holiday, which would make it easier for people commit to a day of working the polls. This is an often proposed measure to help improve voter turnout in elections, but it would also make it easier for potential poll workers. As an example of an imperfect existing law, Illinois does have a state holiday for General Elections Day in November, but that does not even apply to all state bodies, for example it does not apply to state colleges and universities—and I would expect colleges and universities to be fertile ground for election day holiday poll worker recruiting.)
The report also offers a “second group of recommendations seeks to help jurisdictions mitigate the impact of mistakes when they do happen and counter actors who might try to weaponize the mistake to further cast doubt on the legitimacy of a given election.” Those recommendations include expanding the use of post-election audits nationwide, more resources for election offices to review potential vulnerabilities and track problems, development of crisis communications plans, and public after-action reports following signification election administration mistakes. As far as post-election audits go, moreover, a special nod is given to “ risk-limiting audits, which review a certain percentage of ballots in relation to the margin of victory.”
Related reading
Because each of the case studies includes discussion of false claims and amplifications of those false claims, I also went down a bit of a rabbit hole that led me to, among other things, a good Election Integrity Partnership blog post on “10 Factors That Shape a Rumor’s Capacity for Online Virality.” It shares “a threat framework adapted for election officials, analysts, and crisis communication teams.”
Following up on the Harris County, Texas elections case study, I also ended up reading a couple of informative Texas Tribune stories about election operations in Texas: “Here’s how votes are counted in Texas” (a Votebeat piece by Hanna Kozlowska from November 2, 2020) and a more detailed guide by María Méndez from November 4, 2022, “How Texas counts ballots and keeps elections secure.”